Showing 1 - 10 of 87
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375565
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game) to coalitional minimal rights using minimal balanced families of a specific type, thus defining a corresponding minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257257
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008775621
In this paper we study situations where asymmetric players have restricted possibilities for communication. Extreme asymmetry results in a hierarchy among the players. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010949985
Determining the productivity of individual workers engaged in team production is difficult. Monitoring expenses may be high, or the observable output of the entire team may be some single product. One way to collect information about individual productivity is to observe how total output changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081021
In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155725
We construct a market-based mechanism that induces players in a noncooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problem of "The Tragedy of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005157978
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324622
In this paper we study situations where asymmetric players have restricted possibilities for communication. Extreme asymmetry results in a hierarchy among the players. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759200
I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player's actions, it holds...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005110791