This paper conducts a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of social connections in behavioral indirect reciprocity. We provide the evidence of spillovers effects of social ties, e.g., the recipient’s indirect reciprocal act varies with the relations between the donor and a third...

Empirical evidence suggests that parents who have themselves inherited from their own parents are more likely to leave an estate to their children even after controlling for income, wealth and education. This implies an indirect reciprocal behavior between three generations by transmitting the...

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted...

We propose a test of indirect reciprocity using US data on charitable activities in terms of both time and money. We find that expecting help from friends or relatives in the future positively affects the probability and the amount of charitable activities performed.

Cooperation via indirect reciprocity uses a partner's reputation to enable subjects to direct help to those who cooperated themselves. As a partner's reputation provides information whether the partner helped a third party in the past or not, subjects can help those partners with a good...

This paper explores how information about paired subject's previous action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The first experiment puts dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: one where the recipient is a...

The relation between imitation and cooperation in evolutionary settings presents complex aspects. From one hand, in any environment where egoists are favored over cooperators by selection processes, imitation should lead to a further spreading of the former ones due to the combined processes of...

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of...

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of...