Corporate portals are supposed to support a company’s business model and to increase productivity of the employees. However, the productivity gain that can be achieved by corporate portals is often undermined because the users of the portal are not sufficiently informed about the portal’s...

We model the main arguments of the net neutrality debate in a two-sided market framework with network congestion sensitive content providers and Internet consumers on each side, respectively. The platform is controlled by a monopolistic Internet service provider, who may choose to sell content...

We study departures from network neutrality through implementing a Quality of Service tiering regime in which an ISP charges for prioritization on a non-discriminatory basis. We find that Quality of Service tiering may be more efficient in the short run, because it better allocates the existing...

Conventional wisdom attributes different economic outcomes of uniform pricing and price discrimination to the heterogeneity in market conditions or market participants, such as differences in demand elasticity or production costs. We offer a new explanation for the observed differences that...

We study departures from network neutrality through implementing a Quality of Service tiering regime in which an ISP charges for prioritization on a non-discriminatory basis. We find that Quality of Service tiering may be more efficient in the short run, because it better allocates the existing...

Flat rates are a prominent pricing scheme for telecommunications services and are often preferred by consumers although average costs would be lower in an alternative usage-based tariff. Reasons are that flat rates protect against unexpectedly high costs (insurance effect), are more likely to be...

This paper is intended as an introduction to the debate on net neutrality and as a progress report on the growing body of academic literature on this issue. Different non-net neutrality scenarios are discussed and structured along the two dimensions of network and pricing regime. With this...

We introduce a binding unanimous voting rule to a public goods game with an uncertain threshold for the total group contribution. In a laboratory experiment we find that voting generates significantly higher total contributions than making individual voluntary contributions to the public good....

With the use of a laboratory experiment, we show the effects of co-investments on coverage, competition and price collusion in regulated network industries. On the one hand, co-investments turn out not to be a significant driver of new infrastructure investments beyond the level achieved by...