Consider team production with two people. Each is characterized by a prior distribution that he will do Right or Wrong … other worker did Right. The same holds when output depends on the best shot in production and the team effort succeeded. A … leader concerned about his reputation may therefore prefer to work with a person unlikely to do Right. …

current experiment, we attempt to isolate experimentally the role of reputation and social (dis)approval associated to ratings … using a trust game experiment with the opportunity to rate one’s partner (Keser, 2003; Masclet and Penard, 2012). For this …

results suggest that even if social (dis)approval matters, rating observability – and thus reputation – remains critical to …

inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …

inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …

information regarding the reciprocal nature of other players, the FKR design is shown to be conducive to reputation effects while …

players modify their behavior. We conducted a repeated ultimatum game experiment with random strangers, in which one treatment …

cooperate with each other by choosing to show their identities and building good reputation when there is an option to hide them …. We deal with this question using an experimental laboratory. Our experiment shows that a non-negligible fraction of …