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Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2010

We present a model of political selection in which voters elect a president from a set of candidates. We assume that some of the candidates are benevolent and that all voters prefer a benevolent president, i.e. a president who serves the public interest. Yet, political selection may fail in our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008622106

Non-consequentialist voting

Shayo, Moses; Harel, Alon - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012) 1, pp. 299-313

Standard theory assumes that voters’ preferences over actions (voting) are induced by their preferences over electoral outcomes (policies, candidates). But voters may also have non-consequentialist (NC) motivations: they may care about how they vote even if it does not affect the outcome. When...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597459

Attitude-Dependent Altruism, Turnout and Voting

Rotemberg, Julio J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

emerges with nontrivial voting costs and modest altruism. The model can explain higher turnout in close elections as well as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791465

Pocketbook Voting and Social Preferences in Referenda

Meya, Johannes; Poutvaara, Panu; Schwager, Robert - CESifo - 2015

We study the role of self-interest and social preferences in referenda. Our analysis is based on collective purchasing decisions of university students on deep-discount flat rate tickets for public transportation and culture. Individual usage data allows quantifying monetary benefits associated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210405

The Good of the Few: Reciprocity in the Provision of a Public Bad

Jacobson, Sarah; Delaney, Jason - Economics Department, Williams College - 2012

People have been shown to engage in favor-trading when it is efficiency-enhancing to do so. Will they also trade favors when it reduces efficiency, as in a series of wasteful public projects that each benefits an individual? We introduce the Â“Stakeholder Public BadÂ” game to study this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395801

Models of Caring, or Acting as if One Cared, About the Welfare of Others

Rotemberg, Julio J. - In: Annual Review of Economics 6 (2014) 1, pp. 129-154

This article surveys the theoretical literature in which people are modeled as taking other people’s payoffs into account either because this affects their utility directly or because they wish to impress others with their social-mindedness. Key experimental results that bear on the relevance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010886208

Income inequality and social preferences for redistribution and compensation differentials

Kerr, William R. - Suomen Pankki - 2013

In cross-sectional studies, countries with greater income inequality typically exhibit less support for government-led redistribution and greater acceptance of wage inequality (e.g., United States versus Western Europe). If individual nations evolve along this pattern, a vicious cycle could form...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010945116

Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians with Multi-Task Problems

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency. The incentive contract does not require …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789074

Tax Contracts and Elections

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - CER-ETH Center of Economic Research, Department of … - 2009

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557104

How Polarization and Political Instability affect Learning through Experimentation

Ossokina, Ioulia V.; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

following elections (exogenous elections) and <LI>the decision is salient and the election outcome depends on it (endogenous … elections). </OL> We show that while the possibility of learning increases activism, the existence of political instability … distorts learning. Furthermore, in contrast to the existing literature, we demonstrate that, when elections are exogenous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144519