We prove existence and purification results for equilibria in which players choose extreme points of their feasible actions in a class of strategic environments exhibiting a product structure. We assume finite-dimensional action sets and allow for infinite-dimensional externalities. Applied to...

We prove existence and purification results for strategic environments possessing a product structure that includes classes of large games, stochastic games, and models of endogenous institutions. Applied to large games, the results yield existence of pure-strategy equilibria allowing for...

We provide a simple condition that is both necessary and sufficient for aggregation of private information in large elections where all voters have the same preference. In some states of the world, all voters prefer A; and in other states, all voters prefer B. Each voter draws a private signal...

We extend Armstrong’s (1996) result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models providing support for the view that the result holds true in a large class of models. We first relax some of the strong technical assumptions he imposed and provide alternative sufficient conditions for...

We define the class of two‐player zero‐sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For such games, we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game, maximin and minimax strategies for the players,...

We show that Bailey's rule holds true in Cole and Stockman's (1992) model of endogenous specialization. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

We extend Armstrong's result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models in two key ways, providing support for the view that this result is generic and applicable to many different markets. First, we relax the strong technical assumptions he imposed on preferences and consumer types....

We develop an approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior in games. Instead of using lexicographic beliefs to capture infinitely less likely conjectures, we postulate that players use tie-breaking sets to help decide among strategies that are outcome-equivalent given their...

In this note we prove an equilibrium existence theorem for games with discontinuous pay- offs and convex and compact strategy spaces. It generalizes the classical result of Reny (1999) [Econometrica 67, p. 1029-1056], as well as the recent paper of McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky (2011)...

We extend Armstrong’s (1996) result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models in two key ways, providing support for the view that this result is quite generic and applicable to many different markets. First, we relax the strong technical assumptions he imposed on preferences and...