We analyse a simple model of dynamic moral hazard in which there is a clear and tractable trade-off; between static and dynamic incentives. In our model, a principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that...

We analyse a simple model of dynamic moral hazard in which there is a clear and tractable trade-off between static and dynamic incentives. In our model, a principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that...

This paper studies repeated moral hazard in teams. Agents' actions are observable to each other but not to the principal. For any given dynamic contract, agents always select their favorite subgame perfect equilibrium in the corresponding dynamic game. The optimal dynamic contract must take that...

An advocate for a special interest provides information to an uninformed planner for her to consider in making a sequence of important decisions. Although the advocate may have valuable information for the planner, it is is also known that the advocate is biased and will distort her advice if...

This paper investigates how a buyer and a seller exchanging two goods should write the contract, where the seller makes sequences of unobservable relation-specific investments and the buyer privately learns valuations for goods which are stochastically influenced by the investments and these two...

We study the agency problem between a firm and its research employees. In a multi-agent contracting setting, we show explicitly the way in which the optimal incentive regime is a function of how agents' efforts interact with one another: relative-performance evaluation is used when their efforts...

I construct an equilibrium model of the labor market where workers and firms enter into dyamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations.  Upon a termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the worker who is terminated receives a termination...

Economists model time as continuous or discrete. The recent literature on continuous time models with delays should help to bridge the gap between these two families of models. In this note, we propose a simple time–to–build model in continuous time, and show that a discrete time version is...

Cost-benefit and health policy studies often model a consequence occurring over time as a continuous stream of events. Such a consequence is measured by the rates at which events occur or by the states that occur, and the value of the consequence is measured by an integral. This paper presents a...

We develop a dynamic capital valuation model in which each farm can take an action with farm-varying cost to increase the probability of not contracting a disease. In the presence of infection externalities, circumstances are identified under which multiple equilibria exist and where the one...