, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because non …-monetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion. …

(1995), into which collusion and renegotiation possibilities among agents are incorporated. In this model, we prove that … there exists a linear and stationary optimal compensation scheme which is also immune to collusion and renegotiation. …

This paper studies how implicit collusion may take place through simple non-exclusive contracting under adverse …

principal-agent supervisor setting and prove that the recruitment of family members may be seen as a device against collusion …

agent's performance, but could result in vertical collusion. This paper demonstrates that collusion-proofness can require an … inefficiently high payment to the supervisor, and too low powered incentives for the agent. The eventuality of collusion is further …

This paper studies how implicit collusion may take place through simple non-exclusive contracting under adverse …

Die Arbeit untersucht die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen, wenn zwischen dem Kreditverkäufer (Bank) und … Bank übernimmt nach der Veräußerung des Kredits aufgrund eines Moral Hazard Problems auf der Seite des Kredit-nehmers das … der Bank ist für den Käufer des Kredits nicht beobachtbar und überprüfbar, so dass sich die Möglichkeit einer vertikalen …