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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409177
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy, and almost all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002344
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, the concept of strategy-proofness has serious drawbacks. First, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy, and using the wrong dominant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002346
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730971
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, the concept of strategy-proofness has serious drawbacks. First, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy, and using the wrong dominant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005557839
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163089
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163099
The authors identify some fundamental conditions that a 'natural' mechanism should satisfy in exchange economies. First, they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice correspondences to be implemented in Nash equilibria by natural mechanisms. Second, they show that the class...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005400901
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