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The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
Kojima, Fuhito; Ünver, M. - In: Economic Theory 55 (2014) 3, pp. 515-544
The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993536
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Roth, Alvin(born 1951)
Kojima, Fuhito - Palgrave Macmillan
Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing … so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game … theory), studied real-life cases to test the relevance of the theory, conducted laboratory experiments (another field of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861117
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A theory of school choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019208
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Revising the school choice problem
Duddy, Conal - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over students. These priority orderings depend on criteria such as whether a student lives within walking distance or has a sibling already at the school. We argue that by including just the priority orderings in the problem, and not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212785
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Constrained School Choice
Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129
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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects incentives are drastically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547189
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Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach
Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito; Narita, Yusuke - Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, … - 2011
We study the effect of different school choice mechanisms on schools' incentives for quality improvement. To do so, we introduce the following criterion: A mechanism respects improvements of school quality if each school becomes weakly better off whenever that school becomes more preferred by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009353445
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The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism
Unver, M. Utku Ünver; Kojima, Fuhito - Department of Economics, Boston College - 2010
The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce a new axiom, respect of preference rankings. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008456293
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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2008
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823951
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Constrained School Choice
Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823987