We examine research and development (R&D) policies when a national firm forms an R&D alliance with a foreign competitor. Firms differ in their R&D capabilities, and adopt a profit-sharing rule when R&D decisions are coordinated. National R&D tax/subsidy policies are set independently or...

We consider a simple oligopoly model where firms engage in cost-reducing R&D and compare two R&D regimes: R&D competition and R&D cooperation in the form of a research joint venture (RJV). We introduce coordination costs for the RJV and examine how these affect the equilibrium outcomes.

We study fi…rms' preferences towards intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in a North-South context, using a simple duopoly model where a 'North' and a 'South' firm compete in a third market. Unlike other contributions in this fi…eld, we explicitly introduce the South's capability to...

We study firms' preferences towards intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in a North-South context, using a simple duopoly model where a 'North' and a 'South' firm compete in a third market. Unlike other contributions in this field, we explicitly introduce the South's capability to...

Extraterritorial application of national laws are regarded as an infringement of national sovereignty and against the interests of the nations affected by these actions, who frequently oppose their enforcement as a consequence. This paper examines extraterritorial application of national...

This paper employs a global general equilibrium framework and sensitivity analysis to examine why it is that shocks in one country apprear to transmit to comparatively small changes in real factor rewards in its trading partners.