The focus of this paper is on the incentives of firms to invest in research and development (R&D) when sequential moves are taken into account. Leading firms move before followers in investment and in output choices in a four stage game setting. Leaders may compete or cooperate in R&D with other...

This paper investigates the implications of asymmetric spillovers on noncooperative strategic investments in a duopoly with quadratic pay-offs. A unique equilibrium in the announcement of the leader/follower role exists in the case where one firm absorbs large spillovers while the other, at...

In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle their products. Depending on the degree of competitive pressure in the market, either both pairs decide to merge (with or without bundling), or only one pair merges and bundles, while rivals remain...

We model the impact of the transfer price rule (a constraint that re- quires the downstream division of a vertically-integrated ?rm to earn at least a normal rate of return on investment in the counterfactual case that it pays the same price as a nonintegrated ?rm for the essential input), re-...