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Versicherungsbetrug als ökonomisches Problem: Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse
Schiller, Jörg - Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Universität Hamburg - 2004
Vertragstheorie - ausgewählte Ansatzpunkte zur Betrugsbekämpfung und insbesondere das Problem der Sanktionierung von ertappten …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401217
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Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts
Crawford, Vincent P. - Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics - 1986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928223
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Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts
Crawford, Vincent P. - Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics - 1986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701689
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A note on the take-it-or-leave-it bargaining procedure with double moral hazard and risk neutrality
CITANNA, Alessandro - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2003
In this note we study a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining procedure between two risk neutral individuals engaged in the joint stochastic production of a commodity. Each individual has to exert effort, that is, to provide a one-dimensional input which is unobserved to the other individual. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011509
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Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts
Crawford, Vincent P. - Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics - 1986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005558663
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COALITIONAL BELIEFS IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY TU GAMES
LEKEAS, PARASKEVAS V. - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 01, pp. 1350004-1
In cooperative games, due to computational complexity issues, deviant agents are not able to base their behavior on the outsiders' status but have to follow certain beliefs as to how it is in their strategic interest to act. This behavior constitutes the main interest of this paper. To this end,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662637
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On Hierarchies and Communication
Brink, René van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In the literature the distinction between … defined by properties of the set of feasible coalitions. We characterize the feasible sets in communication networks and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256206
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On Hierarchies and Communication
Brink, René van den - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
which they usually take different positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In … feasible sets in communication networks and compare them with feasible sets arising from hierarchies. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137204
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Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication
Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2003
communication we solve two fundamental problems of contracting with imperfect commitment: First, we identify the relevant incentive …€“crossing property. Second, we show that one can restrict the dimensionality of the message spaces of the communication device to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005614494
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Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Gestaltung von Information und Kommunikation in staatlichen Forstorganisationen: Theoretische Analyse und empirische Studien zum internen Berichtswese...
Kenntner, Claudia - University of Freiburg, Chair of Forestry Economics and …
Die vorliegende Untersuchung beschäftigt sich mit der Information und Kommunikation in den forstlichen Organisationen … des Landes Baden-Württemberg. Um Informationen zu erhalten und die Organisation mittels Kommunikation zielorientiert … betrieblichen Information und Kommunikation der forstlichen Organisationen des Landes Baden-Württemberg vorliegen. Auch soll …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265991