Coleman [1971. Control of collectives and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Lieberman, B. (Ed.), Social Choice. Gordon and Breach, New York, pp. 269ï¾–298] suggested two indices of voting power, power to prevent an action and power to initiate an action. This paper rigorously...

Der vorliegende Diskussionsbeitrag entstand im Rahmen eines Forschungsprojektes über die monetäre Integration von fünf mittel- und osteuropäischen EU-Beitrittskandidaten (Polen, Tschechische Republik, Ungarn, Slowenien und Estland). Das hier vorgestellte Kapitel geht auf die...

Despite descriptive empirical evidence on start-up numbers and survival rates of young firms, the interaction of market entry decisions and reactions of incumbent competitors is still insufficiently understood in the entrepreneurship literature. Repeated games offer a suitable theoretical...

This paper develops a new axiomatic characterization of the Banzhaf index of power using four axioms from four different contributions to the area. A nice feature of the characterization is independence of the axioms showing importance of each of them in the exercise.

A sensitivity index quantifies the degree of smoothness with which it responds to fluctuations in the wishes of the members of a voting body. This paper characterizes the Banzhafï¾–Colemanï¾–Dubeyï¾–Shapley sensitivity index using a set of independent axioms. Bounds on the index for...

The paper analyses the evolution of the decision making process within the EU and assesses the effectiveness of the European voting procedures in the context of current and potential future enlargement. Based on a simulation model, we discussed some different scenarios of the voting...

In this paper we establish equivalence between six collections of axioms that all characterize the Carreras-Coleman decisiveness index. Axioms in each of the different sets are shown to be independent.

I present a proof on finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's majority stable sets in multidimensional voting games in the case of differentiable utility functions on Rk and 3 players. The central hypothesis is based on a light separation property which is real common for family of functions...

This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. We present an upper bound on the number of alternatives which guarantees the non emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton and Salles...

This paper develops a new axiomatic characterization of the Banzhaf index of power using four axioms from four different contributions to the area. A nice feature of the characterization is independence of the axioms showing importance of each of them in the exercise.