This series of discussions presents commentaries and a rejoinder on the economic perspectives on branding arising from Moorthy [Moorthy S (2012) Can brand extension signal product quality? <i>Marketing Sci.</i> 31(5):756-770].

In this paper, I examine whether and how warranties serve as signals of product quality in an environment where there are opportunities for consumer moral hazard. My model is very similar to Grossman's. A risk neutral monopolist produced a good of fixed and exogenous quality. This product is...

This research introduces the concept of brand association centrality and distinguishes central brand associations (CBAs) and peripheral brand associations (PBAs). Study 1 shows that the consistency with CBAs and PBAs influences perceived brand extension fit. However, the brand extension...

This paper develops a new dynamic model of Cournot–Nash oligopolistic competition that includes production and transportation costs, product differentiation, and quality levels in a network framework. The production costs capture the total quality cost, which, in turn, can also represent the...

Sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects. One challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople's ability to communicate or customers' ability to process: there is limited...

We address a quality control problem frequently encountered in multi-stage pharmaceutical supply chains transporting drugs from a producer to a wholesaler and eventually to retailers (pharmacies). Depending on the transportation modes and storage methods used, the stages may expose the drugs to...

Researchers and managers broadly agree that coordination and harmony between manufacturing and marketing improve firm performance by eliminating suboptimal practices within the firm. In this paper, we present a contrasting view of the manufacturing-marketing interface. We model a duopoly in...

The paper considers the pricing decision by a seller who has private information about quality. It is shown that, contrary to widespread belief, high quality products may be sold with positive probability even when buyers have no private information. The separating equilibria have a very simple...