Showing 1 - 10 of 110
Members of different social groups often hold widely divergent public beliefs regarding the nature of the world in which they live. We develop a model that can accommodate such public disagreement, and use it to explore questions concerning the aggregation of distributed information and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345026
We develop a model of deliberation under heterogeneous beliefs and incomplete information, and use it to explore questions concerning the aggregation of distributed information and the consequences of social integration. We show that when priors are correlated, all private information is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010599059
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010819791
We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action a<sub>i</sub> is played by a type t<sub>i</sub> in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of t<sub>i</sub> for which a<sub>i</sub> is the only rationalizable plan and whose unique rationalizable belief regarding the play of the game is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010970153
Towards developing a theory of systematic biases about strategies, I analyse strategic implications of a particular bias: wishful thinking about the strategies. I identify a player as a wishful thinker if she hopes to enjoy the highest pay-off that is consistent with her information about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005242896
In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player's bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when. This paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332160
This paper develops and tests a model of how recall of information from past decisions affects subsequent related decisions. A boundedly rational individual has to determine her willingness to pay for a good that she previously considered purchasing at a given price, or provide valuations for a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009214857
Excessive optimism is a prominent explanation for bargaining delays. Recent results demonstrate that optimism plays a subtle role in bargaining, and its careful analysis may shed valuable insights into negotiation behavior. This article reviews some of these results, focusing on the following...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604257
Towards developing a theory of systematic biases about strategies, I analyse strategic implications of a particular bias: wishful thinking about the strategies. I identify a player as a wishful thinker if she hopes to enjoy the highest pay-off that is consistent with her information about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010638109
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112473