The risk-taking channel of monetary policy predicts a negative relationship between interest rates and the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs. Using a sample of U.S. banks over the period 1992-2006, we provide empirical evidence consistent with this prediction. Our finding holds for both...

This paper examines the relation between bank charter value and risk taking. Using a sample of U.S. banks over the period 1990–2006, we find that the relation is U-shaped: as charter value increases, risk taking first decreases and then increases. This finding is robust across alternative...

We study a loan market equilibrium in which some borrowers are optimistic and banks face imperfect competition. We show that the presence of optimistic borrowers reduces the interest rate paid by safe borrowers and increases the interest rate paid by risky borrowers. But it has no net impact on...

This paper presents a model in which requiring banks to issue a proper amount of subordinated debt can constrain their risk taking both before and after debt issuance. The main idea is that the prospect of issuing debt motivates banks to invest in safe assets before debt issuance; holding such...

Recent studies document that some CEOs are overconfident. In this note, we examine the effect of CEO overconfidence on bank risk taking. We measure CEO overconfidence using press data, and bank risk taking using the standard deviation of stock returns. Controlling for a number of CEO- and...

We review the place of Austrian economics in contemporary entrepreneurship and management research, focusing on the contributions of Israel Kirzner. We show that Kirzner’s central concept of entrepreneurial discovery has been vastly influential in theoretical and applied work on...

This study examines the influence of intra‐industry and extra‐industry networks on firm performance by using data on 1264 UK venture‐capital‐backed start‐up companies. The venture's network was operationalized by connecting together the various portfolio companies sharing the same...