The literature on minimum effort game has been concerned with a symmetric game with linear payoff functions. The main aim of the present paper is to study the coordination problem arising in a not necessarily symmetric minimum effort game with two players. The sources of asymmetry can be...

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profile is...

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied which differ for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal...

In this paper we study expectations coordination on a deterministic 2-cycle by an "eductive" approach in which agents are concerned with forecasting the forecasts of others. This approach is grounded in some Common Knowledge assumption. We show that eductively stable 2-cycles exit. We also show...

In this paper we study expectations coordination on the stationary state in a one dimensional economy. We allow for two sources of heterogeneity : the first concerns the fundamentals of the economy, the second the adaptive learning rules. Specifically we consider heterogeneous adaptive learning...

Two parties bargaining over a pie whose size is determined by the investment decisions of both. The bargaining rule is sensitive to the investment behavior. If a symmetric investments profile is observed, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game; otherwise bargaining proceeds...