There are several approaches of sharing resources among users. There is a noncooperative approach wherein each user strives to maximize its own utility. The most common optimality notion is then the Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibria are generally Pareto inefficient. On the other hand, we...

There are several approaches of sharing resources among users. There is a noncooperative approach wherein each user strives to maximize its own utility. The most common optimality notion is then the Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibria are generally Pareto inefficient. On the other hand, we...

A sufficient and necessary condition is presented for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in n-person noncooperative games in normal form where strategy sets are not necessarily convex. Under the convexity condition, we show that this new sufficient and necessary condition is a particular case...

This article establishes the prevalence of deterrence over preemption when targeted governments can choose between either policies or employ both. There is a similar proclivity to favor defensive counter-terrorist measures over proactive policies. Unfortunately, this predisposition results in an...

Fixed point theorems are the standard tool used to prove the existence of equilibria in mathematical economics. This paper shows how to prove a slight generalization of Brouwer's and Kakutani's fixed point theorems using the familiar techniques of drawing and shifting curves in the plane and is,...

Игровая модель, используемая в работе, является композицией марковской модели социальной сети и новой модели, описывающей поведение агентов при аккордном...

There are many situations in which a customer’s proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. Under quite general circumstances, it turns out that...

There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for...

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...

This paper examines the issue of sustaining free trade when countries receive imperfect private information about each other’s non-tariff barriers. Because the countries can misrepresent their private belief about other countries’ protection levels, the punishment scheme to deter...