Japan’s high corporate savings might be holding back growth. We focus on the causes and consequences of the current corporate behavior and suggest options for reform. In particular, Japan’s weak corporate governance—as measured by available indexes—might be...

We examine the association between institutional ownership, political connections, and analyst following in Malaysia from 1999 to 2009. Based on 940 firm-year observations, we document a positive relation between institutional ownership, particularly by Employees Provident Fund (EPF), and...

This paper investigates the mechanisms that firms use to get state favors. We focus on a less well studied but common mechanism: business owners seeking election to top office. Using Thailand as a research setting, we find that business owners who rely on government concessions or are wealthier...

This paper investigates fraudulent financial reporting (FFR) in the China-based companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (called H shares) in which Chinese government officials have a high degree of involvement and heavy impact on audit quality and corporate governance. It intends to...

Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected...

Corporate managers often invest in activities that are deemed to be socially responsible. In some instances, these investments enhance shareholder value. However, in other cases, altruistic managers or managers who privately benefit from the positive attention arising from these activities may...

I measure the value of political connections through their liquidity effect on privately controlled firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China’s stock market over the period of 2003 to 2012. State participation among the top ten shareholders is used as a criterion for classifying a firm...

We examine the value shareholders attribute to one euro of extra cash held by Spanish firms and how corporate governance impacts this value by comparing the value of cash for companies with good and poor governance. The results show that one euro of extra cash is valued at a considerable premium...

We examine whether and, if so, how a U.S. cross-listing mitigates the risk that managers will squander corporate cash holdings. We find strong evidence that the value investors attach to excess cash reserves is substantially larger for foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges and over the counter...