cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails disagreement with high probability. In the unique pair of pure strategy … unattainable. A strongly asymmetric authority relationship is thus the only viable alternative to costly conflict. …

bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers. Commitments decay stochastically, but … attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If …

We examine the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when the delegation contract is renegotiable. We consider a … seller who can either bargain face-to-face with a prospective buyer or delegate bargaining to an intermediary. The … renegotiation prevents a full elination of the commitment effect of delegation. Indeed, there are always gains from delegation when …

This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. We consider a demand game with the … following additional ingredients: (i) There is an exogenous deadline, by which bargaining has to end; (ii) Prior to the deadline … timing in which players make demands. This is important, as multilateral bargaining models are sometimes too sensitive to …

This paper examines the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when renegotiation of the delegation contract cannot … delegation contract. In this model, the time cost of renegotiation prevents a full elimination of the commitment effect of …

The strategic commitment moves that game theory predicts players make may sometimes seem counter-intuitive. We … therefore conducted an experiment to see if people make the predicted strategic move. The experiment uses a simple bargaining …

commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects. …

responsiveness to disagreement payoffs reaches the predicted level. Our results imply that even when real–life bargaining position is …Previous research has shown that individuals do not respond to changes in their bargaining position to the extent … predicted by standard bargaining theories. Most of these results come from experiments with bargaining power allocated …

We use a human–subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’disagreement … game. Both bargaining parties are informed of both disagreement payoffs (and the cake size) prior to bargaining. We find … that bargaining outcomes do vary with the disagreement outcome, but subjects severely under–react to changes in their own …

responsiveness to disagreement payoffs reaches the predicted level. Our results imply that even when real–life bargaining position is …Previous research has shown that individuals do not respond to changes in their bargaining position to the extent … predicted by standard bargaining theories. Most of these results have come from experiments with bargaining power allocated …