Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates …. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum …

Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public-good game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counterproductive. This holds over a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We … test whether thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e., whether a threshold is approved in a …

Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates …. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum …

each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes … experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and …

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting. …

help make such rules effective include the presence of informal sanctions by peers, and implementation through voting. I … after both implemented and randomly overridden voting. I find that informal sanctions strengthen the effect of formal ones …