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left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the … optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822369
-free. Second, the short job duration before retirement implies that the budgetary return and search incentives associated with the …. Finally, even in the special case where search intensity is zero close to retirement, perfect risk-sharing across unemployment … and retirement is welfare-improving thanks to the pension tax. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571582
for a job. This is because of the short time-horizon of workers close to retirement. We propose to introduce a pension tax … pension tax allows those workers near retirement who still do not exercise job search to smooth their consumption during their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577642
left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more decreasing replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract. It is … show that the unemployment benefit agency could take advantage of the retirement period to tax pensions in order to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131149
I construct a dynamic contracting model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard that captures the transition from unemployment to non-participation observed in the data, which the standard moral hazard model fails to capture. My model generates both qualitative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533896
I study the consequences of heterogeneity of skills for the design of an optimal unemployment insurance, using a principal-agent set-up with a risk neutral insurer and infinitely lived risk averse agents. Agents, who are characterised by different productivities or skills, are employed by firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408328
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008611466
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762054
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345268
We ask whether offering a menu of unemployment insurance contracts is welfare improving in a heterogeneous population. We adopt a repeated moral-hazard framework as in Shavell/Weiss (1979) supplemented by unobserved heterogeneity about agents’ job opportunities. Our main theoretical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627970