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Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma
Amegashie, J. Atsu - CESifo - 2009
I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party’s intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034639
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Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan’s Dilemma
Amegashie, J. Atsu - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2009
I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party’s intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558431
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Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und öffentliche … - 2012
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990338
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Brothers in Arms - An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzle
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und öffentliche … - 2011
outside enemy, 'brothers in arms' may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning …; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990349
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Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game
Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007
We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical … prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851463
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Endogenous group formation in experimental contests
Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860231
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Litigated conflict over fundamental rights: A static model.
Bunting, William J. - In: Economics of Peace and Security Journal 8 (2013) 2, pp. 5-12
This article introduces a static, within-country, game-theoretic model of litigated conflict over fundamental rights … the extent to which the litigated conflict over fundamental rights in the society is “constitutionalized” is decreased (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010941305
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Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria
Collier, Paul; Vicente, Pedro C. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008
Following the wave of democratization during the 1990s, elections are now common in low-income societies.  However, these elections are frequently flawed.  We investigate the Nigerian general election of 2007, which is to date the largest election held in Africa and one seriously marred by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004298
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Focused power: Experiments, the Shapley-Shubik power index, and focal points
Geller, Chris R.; Mustard, Jamie; Shahwan, Ranya - Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) - 2013
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956071
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Alliances in the shadow of conflict
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) - 2012
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956225