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Bertrand Delegation Games With Implementability In Weakly Undominated SPNE
Shino, Junnosuke - Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick - 2012
In this paper we investigate a delegation game in which the underling situation is represented by a standard Bertrand price competition. In contrast to Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK), we employ a weakly undominated SPNE as the equilibrium concept based on Shino [2012] and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607670
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2x2 Delegation Games With Implementability In Weakly Undominated SPNE
Shino, Junnosuke - Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick - 2012
In this paper we study delegation environments based on Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK). By imposing a certain assumption on the notion of implementability, called implementability with mutually rational agents, they show that every efficient outcome can be fully implemented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607674
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Evolutionary implementation of optimal city size distributions
Fujishima, Shota - In: Regional Science and Urban Economics 43 (2013) 2, pp. 404-410
We consider the problem of implementing optimal city size distributions. The planner would like to design a policy under which an optimum is achieved in the long-run from any initial state with neither direct population control nor knowledge of preferences. We show that the planner can lead an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010636470
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Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
Kóczy, László Á. - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2012
We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core, a generalisation of the core to such games. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878385
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Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2012
We study the gains from trade in a model with endogenously variable markups. We show that the pro-competitive gains from trade are large if the economy is characterized by (i) extensive misallocation, i.e., large ineciencies associated with markups, and (ii) a weak pattern of cross-country...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903400
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Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University - 2013
) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011014400
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Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization
Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, … - 2013
) implementation with artially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011015104
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Auctioning and selling positions: A non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts
Ju, Yuan; Chun, Youngsub; van den Brink, René - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 33-45
Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930793
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Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
of solutions using monotonicity properties. Finally, we provide a non-cooperative implementation for these solutions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255779
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Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258792