I develop a dynamic model of costly private provision of public goods where agents can also invest in cost-reducing technologies. Despite the n+1 stocks in the model, the analysis is tractable and the (Markov perfect) equilibrium unique. The frame-work is used to derive optimal incomplete...

I develop a dynamic model of private provision of public bads allowing investments in technologies. The analysis is tractable and the MPE unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. While the noncooperative equilibrium is very inefficient,...

I provide a novel dynamic model with private provision of public bads and investments in technologies. The analysis is tractable and the MPE unique. By adding incomplete contracts, I derive implications of and for international climate treaties. While the non-cooperative equilibrium is bad,...

We analyze participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic game where countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the hold-up problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer...

The World's nations have yet to reach a truly effective treaty to control the emission of greenhouse gases.  The importance of compatibility with private incentives of individual countries has been acknowledged (at least by game theorists) in designing climate policies for the post-Kyoto...

Determining comparability of effort between mitigation actions and targets proposed by different countries is an ongoing issue for international climate negotiations. A number of indicators have been proposed to reflect comparability of effort and differences in national circumstances; key...

The Cancún Agreements formalise a collective commitment by developed countries to provide new and additional funding for action on climate change in developing countries both in the short- and longer-term. This collective financial commitment requires a system to measure, report and verify...

The current monitoring, reporting and review framework under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has a number of strengths and weaknesses. Weaknesses include inconsistent and/or incomplete self reporting of financial support; infrequent reporting; limited and incomplete...

Developed countries have committed under the international negotiations to jointly mobilising USD 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. Yet consistent and comprehensive data to track this commitment are currently lacking. Such data...

Tackling the problem of global climate change requires a high level of international cooperation. Many countries have pledged targets or actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the Appendices to the Copenhagen Accord. This analysis examines the costs and effectiveness of these pledges,...