I develop a dynamic model of costly private provision of public goods where agents can also invest in cost-reducing technologies. Despite the n+1 stocks in the model, the analysis is tractable and the (Markov perfect) equilibrium unique. The frame-work is used to derive optimal incomplete...

I develop a dynamic model of private provision of public bads allowing investments in technologies. The analysis is tractable and the MPE unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. While the noncooperative equilibrium is very inefficient,...

I provide a novel dynamic model with private provision of public bads and investments in technologies. The analysis is tractable and the MPE unique. By adding incomplete contracts, I derive implications of and for international climate treaties. While the non-cooperative equilibrium is bad,...

We analyze participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic game where countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the hold-up problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer...

The World's nations have yet to reach a truly effective treaty to control the emission of greenhouse gases.  The importance of compatibility with private incentives of individual countries has been acknowledged (at least by game theorists) in designing climate policies for the post-Kyoto...

I explore possible impacts of reciprocal preferences on participation in international environmental agreements. Reciprocal countries condition their willingness to abate on others' abatement. No participation is always stable. A full or majority coalition can be stable, provided that...

International climate negotiations have been troubled by mutual mistrust. At the same time, a hope seems to prevail that once enough countries moved forward, others would follow suit. If the abatement game faced by climate negotiators is a Prisoners' Dilemma, and countries are narrowly...

Tackling the problem of global climate change requires a high level of international cooperation. Many countries have pledged targets or actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the Appendices to the Copenhagen Accord. This analysis examines the costs and effectiveness of these pledges,...

Many countries have pledged targets or actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; these have been listed in the Appendices to the Copenhagen Accord and, at the time of writing, are being transferred to the UNFCCC Cancún Agreements. This analysis examines the costs and effectiveness of these...

Determining comparability of effort between mitigation actions and targets proposed by different countries is an ongoing issue for international climate negotiations. A number of indicators have been proposed to reflect comparability of effort and differences in national circumstances; key...