A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant†parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we...

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or "vigilant" parties. In this paper, we explore the economic efficiency of liability rules based on comparative vigilance. We devise rules that are efficient...

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant” parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the...

In this short paper we provide two simple new versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. Both versions are extremely transparent. The first version assumes a two-agent society; the second version, which is similar to a theorem of Pollak, assumes two...

In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.

This paper develops two straightforward value of life models; one is a probabilistic value of life model and the second is a determinstic value of time model. Simplifying assumptions allow both models to be solved analytically. Constant relative risk aversion utility functions are used, and both...