The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification—<InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$s$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving...</equationsource></inlineequation>

Benoît and Ok (Games Econ Behav 64:51–67, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2008</CitationRef>) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social choice correspondence (SCC) is Maskin’s monotonic if and only if it is Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism (Benoît-Ok’s Theorem). This paper...</citationref>

This paper analyses the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive justice in the context of social welfare orderings. An axiom capturing a liberal non-interfering view of society, named the Weak Harm Principle, is studied, whose roots can be traced back to...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...

Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it...

Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with artially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it...

Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it...

A reason-based choice correspondence rationalizes choice behaviour in terms of a two-stage choice procedure. Given a feasible set S, the individual eliminates from it all of the dominated alternatives according to her fixed (not necessarily complete) strict preference relation, in the first...

The paper proposes necessary and suffi cient conditions for the natural implementation of (efficient) social choice correspondences (SCCs) in pure finite exchange economies when some of the agents are partially honest. A partially honest agent is an agent who strictly prefers to tell the truth...