Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of … internal fight reduces the alliance’s ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make non …-binding declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance …

Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of …-binding declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance … more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players’ contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal …

; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest … repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what … outside enemy, 'brothers in arms' may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning …

, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against … repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what … outside enemy, brothers in arms may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however …

The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the … alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis … of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former ‘brothers in arms’ fight even …

; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest … repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what … outside enemy, ‘brothers in arms’ may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning …

alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending effort above average choose to stand alone. If these players are forced … to play in an alliance, they invest even more, whereas their co-players choose lower effort. Anticipation of this …

endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance … play in an alliance, they invest even more, whereas their co-players choose lower effort. Anticipation of this exploitation …