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No judge, no job!: Judicial discretion and incomplete labor contracts

Christmann, Robin - Hamburgisches WeltWirtschaftsInstitut (HWWI) - 2010

investigated and compared to the effects of specific legislation. It is shown that the efficient relation of legislative law making …. The model also suggests a mutual dependency between legislation and adjudication to establish efficiency in law …, contradicting the traditional legal doctrines of exclusive legislation or sole case-law. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009211065

Warum brauchen wir Richter?

Christmann, Robin - Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre, Helmut Schmidt … - 2010

Richterliche Leitsätze sind heute prägender Bestandteil der Rechtssetzung und Rechtsschöpfung in vielen Rechtsgebieten. Obwohl jedoch richterliche Entscheidungen unvermeidbar subjektiv und fehlbar sind, bleibt die Frage nach Leistungsfähigkeit und Grenzen dieses Richterrechts in der...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008519780

The Law and Economics of Dismissal Regulation - A Comparative Analysis of the US and UK Systems

Beck, Matthias - Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance … - 1996

This paper analyzes competing models of dismissal regulation from a Law and Economics perspective, using the contemporary US and UK dismissal regimes as a comparative benchmark. The regulation of dismissals in the UK and US differs widely in spite of their joint common-law tradition. Whereas the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005673156

Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency: A non-contingent approach

Willington, Manuel; Costilla, Roy - ILADES, Facultad de Economía y Negocios - 2007

In the context of a principal-agent model where verification of an agent’s effort is endogenously determined through strategic interactions between contracting parties, we derive a necessary and suficient condition to achieve the first best with a non-contingent or incomplete contract. These...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808249

Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts

MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233793

Hold-Up under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law

Willington, C. Manuel - Econometric Society - 2004

Two main results have been obtained on the literature on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem. First, a contract specifying a price and quantity of the final good to be traded will, fairly generally, induce efficient investments if these are `selfish' in nature, i.e., each party's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328878

The Hold-up Problem Under Common Agency

Nicita, Antonio; Sepe, Simone - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2012

Many real world transactions occur in a common agency environment in which an agent interacts with several principals having competing interests. The hold-up literature, however, has so far neglected to investigate common agency transactions. In this paper, we consider the hold-up problem that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552852

Do we need handshakes to cooperate in buyer-supplier relationships?

Sousa, José De; Fairise, Xavier - Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), … - 2009

Based on differences in production costs, McLaren (1999) [“Supplier relations and the market context: a theory of handshakes”, Journal of International Economics 48, 121-138] demonstrates that informal ‘handshake’ arrangements foster cooperation in buyer-supplier relationships, compared...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635706

Completing contracts ex post: How car manufacturers manage car dealers

Arruñada, Benito; Garicano, Luis; Vázquez, Luis - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998

This article illustrates how contracts are completed ex post in practice and, in so doing, indirectly suggests what the real function of contracts may be. Our evidence comes from the contracts between automobile manufacturers and their dealers in 23 dealership networks in Spain. Franchising...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772526

Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments

Stremitzer, Alexander - University of Bonn, Germany - 2009

When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling “expectation damages” close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of contract law induces the ?rst best. Yet, in order to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005009778

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