We develop a network-flow approach for characterizing interim-allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations. Our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi-unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints, both ceilings and floors....

Der Beitrag untersucht die optimale Versteigerungsreihenfolge in sequentiellen Zweitpreisauktionen mit vertikal differenzierten Objekten.

A tanulmány az aukciókkal foglalkozó közgazdasági irodalmat tekinti át; megvizsgálja milyen elméleti modelleket alkottak a kutatók, milyen feltételezésekkel éltek ezek felállításakor, mennyire valóságosak ezek, és milyen következményekkel jár elhagyásuk. Majd a gyakorlat...

Közbeszerzésnek ebben a cikkben egy oszthatatlan jószág vásárlását nevezzük, ahol, noha a vásárló jólétét a termék minősége utólag befolyásolja, azt előre nem lehet szerződésbe foglalni, s így számon kérni sem. Megmutatjuk, hogy ilyenkor egyfajta korlátozott árverés...

In a fair division game an indivisible object with an unknown common value is owned by a group of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while the others are compensated monetarily. Implementing fair division games in the lab, we fi nd many occurrences of the winner's curse under the...

This paper shows the importance of correcting for sample selection when investing in illiquid assets with endogenous trading. Using a large sample of 20,538 paintings that were sold repeatedly at auction between 1972 and 2010, we find that paintings with higher price appreciation are more likely...

Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...

Liberalization of network industries frequently separates the network from the other parts of the industry. This is important in particular for the electricity industry where private firms invest into generation facilities, while net- work investments usually are controlled by regulators. We...

Practical or legal constraints often restrict auctions to being symmetric (anonymous and nondiscriminatory). We examine when this restriction prevents a seller from achieving his objectives. In an independent private value setting with heterogenous buyers, we characterize the set of incentive...

We study auction design in the standard symmetric independent private values environment, where the seller lacks the commitment power to withhold an unsold object off the market. The seller has a single object and can conduct an infinite sequence of standard auctions with reserve prices to...