the no default equilibrium, banks keep enough reserves and remain solvent. In the mixed equilibrium, some banks default … emerges when banks exercise market power. Thus, competition is beneficial to financial stability. The effect of default on …

shortage sell loans on the interbank market. Two equilibria emerge. In the no default equilibrium, all banks hold enough … reserves and remain solvent. In the mixed equilibrium, some banks default with positive probability. The former exists when …

shortage sell loans on the interbank market. Two equilibria emerge. In the no default equilibrium, all banks hold enough … reserves and remain solvent. In the mixed equilibrium, some banks default with positive probability. The former exists when …

explaining banks� probability of default. By confirming the role of funding as a driver of banking crisis, the paper also …

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether … the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default …

market, banks generally sold low-default-risk loans into the secondary market while retaining higher-default-risk loans in …. Securitization strategy of lenders changed dramatically in 2007 as the crisis set in with most unwilling to retain higher-default …

developed a model with heterogeneous agents and an active interbank market, characterized by an endogenous default probability …. The key feature of the analysis is that the probability of default evolves endogenously and is taken into account by banks …, of their surplus funds on loans to other financial institutions, if the probability of default is high enough, preferring …

should be injected during a default episode or to evaluate the impact of raising capital before the occurrence of default …