This paper examines the positions of Coase and Pigou in regard to the problem of external effects (externalities). Assessing their two most important works, it appears that Coase has a more relevant preference for an evaluation of total efficiency, while Pigou, with some exceptions, is convinced...

This paper considers the role of government in the case of externalities and, in particular, in the case of alcohol externalities. The purpose of the paper is to assess whether the current level of the alcohol excise can be justified on externality grounds. The paper assesses various mechanisms...

Environmental concerns are becoming increasingly popular and nowadays find their place on the policy-makers agenda. The basic question that arises in these circumstances is whether environmental theses are consistent or not with the economic theory. Environmental issues must go through the...

The purpose of this paper is to extend the economic literature regarding the questions of (1) how consumers choose the size of their vehicles; (2) how privately optimal choices of vehicle size may diverge from socially optimal choices; and (3) how privately optimal choices can be better...

This paper studies environmental taxation in a Mirrlees setting when energy, a polluting good, is used both as a factor of production and a final consumption good. The model is calibrated for the Czech economy. We study two different tax systems. Both consider a non-linear income tax but the...

This theoretical note examines the usefulness of the Pigouvian tax policy in dealing with negative production externalities and in improving social welfare in a small developing economy. A two-sector, full-employment general equilibrium model with exogenous labour market imperfection is used for...

Over the recent past, technological advances (among other effects) have opened a grey area of intellectual property that cannot be properly covered by either of the two existing legal regimes, patent and copyright. Some innovations do not fall easily into either regime, while others seem to fall...

What if consumers' actions reveal concern for contributing to an externality, even without a pecuniary incentive? Within a two-level model, a policymaker prices disposal of waste, and a representative consumer chooses a consumption level for a dirty good and a division of the consequent waste...