Address given in shortened form at the occasion of accepting the appointment as Full Professor of "Institutional Design of Integrating Markets" at the Rotterdam School of Management / Faculteit Bedrijfskunde of Erasmus University Rotterdam on Friday, June 15, 2001

Address given in shortened form at the occasion of accepting the appointment as Full Professor of "Institutional Design of Integrating Markets" at the Rotterdam School of Management / Faculteit Bedrijfskunde of Erasmus University Rotterdam on Friday, June 15, 2001

This paper studies the consequences of using a debt contract to raise venture capital for an entrepreneurial project in an adverse selection setting with different quality venture capitalists. The paper considers not only the likelihood of success of a one-time project being dependent on the...

A number of issues that relate to the desirability and implications of new venture financing are examined within a principal-agent framework that captures the essence of the relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The model suggests: (1) As long as the skill levels of...

We analyze venture capital budgeting in a model with agency conflicts among entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and investors. Our three-player setting is crucial for the analysis of compensation to venture capitalists. We focus on the venture capitalist's decision to invest in correlated...

This report looks specifically at the full array of public policies promoting investment in the renewable energy sector, and discusses their impact on plant entry into the market, with the support of case studies focusing on Germany, the U.S.A. and Australia. It examines differing risk/return...

Optimal contracts are derived from a simple model where government guarantees two types of private investors participationg in infrastructure projects. With asymmetric information, investors are offered a pair of incentive-compatible contracts covering production, tariff, and guarantee coverage....

This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information, when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricing and usage-based pricing are feasible and administering usage-based pricing may involve transaction costs. It is shown that offering fixed-fee pricing in addition...