On theoretical grounds alone, there is no a priori reason why higher taxes should reduce the desired capital stock, since a tax increase reduces marginal returns but also increases depreciation and interest payment allowances. Using a panel of Chilean corporations, this paper estimates a...

An essential facility produces “access,” an essential input used by a competitive downstream industry. The access charge is regulated. The essential facility can vertically integrate into the downstream segment and sabotage rivals increasing their costs. We systematically study the vertical...

Is a tax increase always detrimental for capital formation? This paper estimates a long-run demand for capital in Chile, and studies the responsiveness of firms’ desired capital stock to variations in tax rates. We combine the neoclassical model with a cointegration argument to obtain a...

We examine the revelation of preferences of justices whose true ideologies are not known when entering the Court but gradually become apparent through their judicial decisions. In a 2-period president-Senate-Court game, we show that some new justices vote disingenuously and so move the perceived...

Even justices who have already decided to retire may not wish to make that information public immediately. Strategically shaping perceptions of their own retirement possibilities can maximize justices' chances of leaving behind a Court with an ideology aligned with their own ideologies. An...

We examine the revelation of preferences of justices whose true ideologies are not known at the moment of entering the Court but gradually become apparent through their judicial decisions. In the context of a two-period President-Senate-Court game — a generalization of Moraski and Shipan...

Public choice theory sheds light on many aspects of legislation, regulation, and constitutional law and is critical to a sophisticated understanding of public policy. The editors of this landmark addition to the law and economics literature have organized the Handbook into four main areas of...

This article develops and empirically tests two theories of the causes of variation in levels of litigation in the United States: that litigation rates are affected by political structure and by economic strength. Fragmented political power results in less detailed legislation and a more...