Showing 1 - 10 of 5,165
workers’ identity through contracts offered by the firm. In the model, identity is a motivation source which reduces agents … when principal include mission-sense developing investments in contracts. By mission we mean a single culture that is …This paper explores optimality of contracts and incentives when the principal (public organisation) can undertake …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860717
workers’ identity through contracts offered by the firm. In the model, identity is a motivation source which reduces agents … include investments to foster identity in contracts. Think for instance in developing a single culture that is shared by all …This paper explores optimality of contracts and incentives when the principal (public organization) can undertake …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860721
that “full” identity can be achieved when health managers include mission supportive investments in contracts. This also … motivation and identity through contracts offered by the health manager. Identity and intrinsic motivation of the doctor can be … defined as doctor’s experienced enjoyment from doing her work and commit toward a mission. By “full” identity we mean a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651932
This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860716
This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010626201
We study a combinatorial variant of the classical principal-agent model. In our setting a principal wishes to incentivize a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort on his behalf. Agentsʼ actions are hidden and the principal observes only the outcome of the team, which depends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042925
Abstract This paper studies the optimal organizational form and the optimal type of manager by considering the nonmaterial (psychological) payoff as well as the standard material payoff for agents. I compare two organizational forms: T-form, where all agents have the same job title so that they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011911
banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex-ante require costly crises to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862702
banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019233
The implementation of nature conservation policy in the EU is often based on contracts between public authorities and … landowners. We model these contracts in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard when the outcome is uncertain. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025452