by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality. …

systems, in which there is common knowledge of rationality and a common prior. We show here that common knowledge of … rationality is not needed: when rationality is satisfied in the support of an action-consistent distribution (a concept introduced … rational belief systems’ there may not be mutual knowledge of rationality, let alone common knowledge of rationality. In the …

functions, of rationality, and of the conjectures implies that the conjectures form a Nash equilibrium. When n ≥ 3 and there is … a common prior, mutual knowledge of the payoff functions and of rationality, and common knowledge of the conjectures … — about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as …

, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement — that is, the avoidance of weakly dominated … formulate conditions of rationality and mth-order assumption of rationality (RmAR) and rationality and common assumption of … rationality (RCAR). We show that (i) RCAR is characterized by a solution concept we call a “self-admissible set”; (ii) in a …

Best-response sets (Pearce [1984]) characterize the epistemic condition of “rationality and common belief of … rationality.” When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept … (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008]) characterizes “rationality and common assumption of rationality.” We analyze the …

-theoretic approach starts from the assumption that the rationality of the players is common knowledge. This leads to the notion of …