In this article, we analyse the distribution of voting power in governing coalitions of the German Laender (states). In a first step, we use the number of votes of parties in a parliament to determine the voting power of the parties. Based on these results, we apply the <inline-formula> <inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="rael_a_797548_o_ilm0001.gif"/> </inline-formula>-power index (Casajus,...

In this paper, we employ the coalition structure approach of cooperative game theory to analyse three problems. First, we group local authorities in special purpose associations in an optimal way. Second, we use the PCore (Casajus, A, Tutic, A (<CitationRef CitationID="CR4">2007</CitationRef>) <ExternalRef> <RefSource>http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~micro/pcore.pdf</RefSource> <RefTarget Address="http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~micro/pcore.pdf" TargetType="URL"/>...</refsource></externalref></citationref>

In this article, the author analyses the distribution of power in the current and possible German government coalitions following the federal election in September 2013 based on statements made by the parties with regard to various potential coalitions in advance of the election. He accounts for...

This paper employs the χ-value to analyse who benefits from investments in general and in specific human capital, the employer or the employee. Within this framework, we replicate the standard results of human capital theory.

In this article, we employ team games (Hernández-Lamoneda and Sánchez-Sánchez, 2010) and the Shapley (1953) value to analyse the performance/importance of players in teams of the Bundesliga (German football league) in the season 2012/2013.

In this paper we employ the <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\chi $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="italic">χ</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> value (Casajus, Games Econ Behav 65(1): 49–61, <CitationRef CitationID="CR3">2009</CitationRef>)—a coalition structure value—to analyse team games (Hernández and Sánchez-Sánchez, Int J Games Theory 39(3): 319–350, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2010</CitationRef>) . We answer two questions for two special cases: first, which...</citationref></citationref></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

This paper employs the Chi-value to analyse who benefits from investments in general or in specific human capital, the employer or the employee. Within this framework, we replicate the standard results of human capital theory.