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The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information
Besancenot, Damien; Dubart, Delphine; Vranceanu, Radu - ESSEC Business School - 2012
Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010545145
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The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information
Besancenot, Damien; Dubart, Delphine; Vranceanu, Radu - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (2013) C, pp. 239-247
Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game with an informed proposer and an uninformed responder, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about his endowment. A simple message game with heterogenous players with respect to lying costs shows that in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048127
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The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information
Besancenot, Damien; Dubart, Delphine; Vranceanu, Radu - HAL - 2012
Humans can lie strategically in order to leverage on their negotiation power. For instance, governments can claim that a "scapegoat" third party is responsible for reforms that impose higher costs on citizens, in order to make the pill sweeter. This paper analyzes such communication strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899150
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Dishonesty under scrutiny
Ven, Jeroen van de; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014
We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy’s (2005) deception game. We add a third … sender’s lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942938
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Lies and biased evaluation: A real-effort experiment
Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie Claire - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2012) 2, pp. 537-549
selfish black lies (that increase the supervisor's earnings at the detriment of the worker) and Pareto white lies (that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594586
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Dishonesty under Scrutiny
van de Ven, Jeroen; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy's (2005) deception game. We add a third … sender's lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011078393
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Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment
Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
black lies (increasing the supervisor's earnings while decreasing the worker's payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the … earnings of both) according to Erat and Gneezy (2009)'s terminology are frequent. In contrast, spiteful black lies (decreasing … the earnings of both) and altruistic white lies (increasing the earnings of workers but decreasing those of the supervisor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225776
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Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment
Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011
black lies (increasing the supervisor’s earnings while decreasing the worker’s payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the … earnings of both) according to Erat and Gneezy (2009)’s terminology are frequent. In contrast, spiteful black lies (decreasing … the earnings of both) and altruistic white lies (increasing the earnings of workers but decreasing those of the supervisor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318147
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The cost of lying
Lundquist, Tobias; Ellingsen, Tore; Gribbe, Erik; … - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2007
strength of the promise. Freely formulated messages lead to the fewest lies and the most efficient outcomes. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649157
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Do Liars Believe? Beliefs and Other-Regarding Preferences in Sender-Receiver Games
Sheremeta, Roman; Shields, Timothy - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We examine subjects’ behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects’ beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259082