Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his own ability, but may or may not know those of his rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more e¤ort and output are engendered under incomplete information;...

We consider abstract exchange mechanisms wherein individuals submit "diversified" offers in m commodities, which are then redistributed to them. Our first result is that if the mechanism satisfies certain natural conditions embodying "fairness" and "convenience" then it admits unique prices, in...

We consider mechanisms that provide traders the opportunity to exchange commodity i for commodity j, for certain ordered pairs ij. Given any connected graph G of opportunities, we show that there is a unique mechanism M_G that satisfies some natural conditions of "fairness" and "convenience."...

Consider agents who undertake costly effort to produce stochastic outputs observable by a principal. The principal can award a prize deterministically to the agent with the highest output, or to all of them with probabilities that are proportional to their outputs. We show that, if there is...

Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete...

In this paper we give a survey of recent works on game theory devoted to modeling of decision making process under bounded rationality. An agent's deviation from rational choice understood as maximization of gain can be caused by moral principles (religious beliefs, altruism, patriotism),...

In this paper we give a survey of recent work on game theory devoted to modeling decision making under bounded rationality. An agent's deviation from rational choice understood as maximization of gain can be caused by moral principles (religious beliefs, altruism, patriotism), emotions (envy,...

This paper examines an Outside Option Game Designed to study the tension between maximizing the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of thus surplus among those who contributed to its creation.

The present paper illustrates the coordination problem with a standard two-person non-cooperative gae, with yields two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, one of which is Pareto dominated by the other.