In this article, we examine the role played by heterogeneity in the popular “connections model” of Jackson and Wolinsky (J Econ Theory 71(1):355–365, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1996</CitationRef>). We prove that when heterogeneity with respect to the values of resources, or the information decay parameter, depends on the identity...</citationref>

This paper examines strict Nash networks in the noncooperative directed flow model of Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 68(5):1181–1230, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2000</CitationRef>) with partner heterogeneity (payoff of a player in a link depends on the identity of her link partner). We focus on the asymmetries with regard to the...</citationref>

In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi’s model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks.

In this paper we characterize efficient networks for network formation games with global spillovers, that satisfy convexity and sub-modularity properties. This allows us to complete the work of Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Westbrock on collaborative oligopoly networks. In particular, we establish...

Our paper belongs to the strand of literature associated with the notion of Nash networks introduced by Bala and Goyal [1] in the connections model. Our aim is to consider situations where agent i has concerns about the validity of information that she acquires from agent j. Independently...

Social networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. In many networks agents will value confirmation of the information they receive from others. Our paper...

This paper analyzes the asymmetries with regard to the resources obtained by groups of players in equilibrium networks. We use the notion of condensation networks which allows us to partition the population into sets of players who obtain the same resources and we order these sets according to...

We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise...