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A Four Country Comparision of Spite, Cooperation and Errors in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms.
Brandts, J.; Saijo, T.; Schram, A. - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka … - 2000
This paper presents data from experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458114
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A Four Country Comparision of Spite, Cooperation and Errors in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms.
Brandts, J.; Saijo, T.; Schram, A. - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka … - 2000
This paper presents data from experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486484
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An Experimental Study of Storable Votes
Casella, Alessandra; Gelman, Andrew; Palfrey, Thomas R - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the multiple decisions. Voters are induced to spend more votes on those decisions that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662312
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Redistribution, Political Power, and Public Goods.
McGuire, M. - California Irvine - School of Social Sciences - 2000
The core of the argument offered here is that the trade off between these two choices boils down to a benefit cost calculation rather than a Bergsonian or Arrovian value judgement: i.e., in return for the net benefits which a society obtains from the productive, public good supplying activities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486842
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Bevolent Planners, Malevolent Dictators and Democratic Voters
Agell, Jonas; Persson, Mats - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet - 2006
We study the size of government and of GDP, under autocratic and democratic rule, respectively. It turns out that first, both democratic and authoritarian rulers apply the Samuelson (1954) criterion when deciding on productive public goods. Second, the labor supply elasticity and the skewness of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005648530
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On Punishment and Well-being
Brandts, Jordi; Rivas, María Fernanda - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007
The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in public goods experiments to increase … considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an … experiment to study the conjecture that an environment with stronger punishment possibilities leads to higher material but lower …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851350
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On Punishment and Well-being
Brandts, Jordi; Rivas, María Fernanda - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007
The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in public goods experiments to increase … considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an … experiment to study the conjecture that an environment with stronger punishment possibilities leads to higher material but lower …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572157
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Welfare Implications of Peer Punishment in Unequal Societies
Visser, Martine - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan - 2006
in equally endowed groups. Punishment results in a redistribution of wealth from high to low endowment players within …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423962
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Feuds in the Laboratory? A Social Dilemma Experiment
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Engelmann, Dirk - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2008
punishment opportunities to investigate whether the threat of feuds is e¢ ciency enhancing. Treatments di¤er with respect to … whether a punish- ment can trigger a feud. In the main treatment (Feud) the number of punishment stages is endogenously … feuds. While the possibility of a feud a¤ects punishment and contribution patterns, total earnings are not signi?cantly di …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574884
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Not-dividing the Indivisible: Formation of the Sacred and Antagonistic Conflicts
Bellanca, Nicolò; Innocenti, Stefani - Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, … - 2013
Indivisibilities are at the core of economic theory as rarely individuals can or want to limitlessly divide goods, inputs and activities, as well as related economic phenomena such as economies of scale, externalities and public goods. Indivisibilities help in explaining conflicts over social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010857763