We propose a new methodology exploring Markov perfect equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching. Specifically, we develop a general game with two players having two kinds of strategies. Players choose an action that inuences the evolution of a state variable, and decide...

We develop a dynamic game to provide with a theory of Arab spring-type events. We consider two interacting groups, the elite vs the citizens, two political regimes, dictatorship vs a freer regime, the possibility to switch from the first to the second regime as a consequence of a revolution, and...

We consider a framework à la Wirl (1994) where political liberalization is the outcome of a lobbying differential game between a conservative elite and a reformist group, the former player pushing against political liberalization in opposition to the latter. In contrast to the benchmark model,...

This study proposes a new mechanism for the resource curse: crowding-out of innovation due to the existence of an option to engage in conflict. Using a game theoretical framework, it is argued that an increase in the amount of natural resources (in the informal sector where conflict for a...

By examining annual data (1994-2003) for 15 countries from East Asia and the Pacific, this study provides an analysis of the effects of political institutions and other socioeconomic factors on deforestation. Results show that economic prosperity does not automatically cause higher environmental...

We propose a new methodology exploring Markov perfect equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching. Specifically, we develop a general game with two players having two kinds of strategies. Players choose an action that influences the evolution of a state variable, and...

Using a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group fighting, i.e. the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the role of leader behavior in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly chosen leader of the group determines...

We develop a continuous time dynamic game to provide with a benchmark theory of Arab Spring-type events. We consider a resource-dependent economy with two interacting groups, the elite vs. the citizens, and two political regimes, dictatorship vs. a freer regime. Transition to the freer regime...

We propose a new methodology exploring Markov perfect equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching. We develop a general game with two players. Players choose an action that inuences the evolution of a state variable, and decide on the switching time from one regime to...