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We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751017
We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Selden (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989) and Quiggin (1982) are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794122
We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Selden [26], Epstein and Zin [9] and Quiggin [24] are well-ordered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008678317
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861555
Private insurance for long-term care is underdeveloped in European countries and in the US. This paper tries to understand why the market is underdevelopped by using a theoretical approach and putting the emphasis on insurance demand. It shows that demand for long term care insurance can be low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706485
The present paper thoroughly explores second-best efficient allocations in an insurance economy with adverse selection. We start with a natural extension of the classical model, assuming less than perfect risk perception. We characterize the constraints on efficient redistribution, and we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707021
We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and apply it to intertemporal choice models. This makes it possible to investigate whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired from Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Selden (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989) or Quiggin...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707569
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707658
We study an economywhere intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. In this context, we show that, contrarily to what is commonly believed, market equilibria may fail to be efficient even if the planner is not allowed to enforce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071873
Private insurance for long-term care is underdeveloped in European countries and in the US. This paper tries to understand why the market is underdevelopped by using a theoretical approach and putting the emphasis on insurance demand. It shows that demand for long term care insurance can be low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011184182