We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes....

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under a wide class of learning processes. We...

We report experiments studying mixed strategy Nash equilibria that are theoretically stable or unstable under learning. The Time Average Shapley Polygon (TASP) predicts behavior in the unstable case. We study two versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors that include a fourth strategy, Dumb. The unique...

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes....

Posted offer markets with costly buyer search are investigated in 18 laboratory sessions. Each period sellers simultaneously post prices. Then each buyer costlessly observes one or (with probability 1-q) two of the posted prices, and either accepts an observed price, drops out, or pays a cost to...

This paper reports a laboratory experiment that examines price formation in the single call market. The experiment design is intended to enhance the predictive power of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) theory for this trading institution. The data support several qualitative implications of...