We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition...

We develop a tractable framework for the analysis of the relationship between contractual incompleteness, technological complementarities, and technology adoption. In our model, a firm chooses its technology and investment levels in contractible activities by suppliers of intermediate inputs....

We present a Northâ€South model of international trade in which differentiated products are developed in the North. Sectors are populated by finalâ€good producers who differ in productivity levels. On the basis of productivity and sectoral characteristics, firms decide whether to integrate...

Roughly one-third of world trade is intrafirm trade. This paper starts by unveiling two systematic patterns in the volume of intrafirm trade. In a panel of industries, the share of intrafirm imports in total U. S. imports is significantly higher, the higher the capital intensity of the exporting...

We study how financial frictions and the saving rate shape the long-run effects of trade liberalization on income, consumption and the distribution of wealth in financially underdeveloped economies. In our model, regardless of whether the capital account is open or not, trade liberalization...

We survey an emerging literature at the intersection of organizational economics and international trade. We argue that a proper modeling of the organizational aspects of production provides valuable insights on the aggregate workings of the world economy. In reviewing the literature, we...

How do foreign interests influence the policy determination process? What are the welfare implications of such foreign influence? In this paper we develop a model of foreign influence and apply it to the study of optimal tariffs. We develop a two-country voting model of electoral competition,...

How does the formation of cross-country teams affect the organization of work and the structure of wages? To study this question, we propose a theory of the assignment of heterogeneous agents into hierarchical teams, where less skilled agents specialize in production and more skilled agents...

I present a model in which the incomplete nature of contracts governing international transactions limits the extent to which the production process can be fragmented across borders. Because of contractual frictions, goods are initially manufactured in the same country where product development...