We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a...

We study the concept of correlated equilibrium within the framework of social situations (Greenberg 1990) and find that the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior (OSSB) of an appropriately defined correlated situation is nothing but the set of correlated equilibria. We generalize this...

In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model we allow for mediation in which the informed agent reports one possible element of a partition to a mediator (a communication device) and then the mediator suggests an action to the uninformed decision-maker according to the...

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a...

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we provice that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated...