It is a common concern that pricing pressure by powerful buyers discourages suppliers' R&D investments. Employing a simple monopsonist - competitive upstream industry - framework, this paper qualifies this view in two respects. First, the monopsonist has an incentive to subsidize upstream R&D...

This is a successive oligopoly model with two brands. Each downstream firm chooses one brand to sell on a final market. The upstream firms specialize in the production of one input specifically designed for the production of one brand, but they also produce the input for the other brand at an...

We develop an index theory for the Stationary Subgame Perfect (SSP) equilibrium set in a class of n-player <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$(n\ge 2)$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> sequential bargaining games with probabilistic recognition rules. For games with oligarchic voting rules (a class that includes unanimity rule), we establish conditions on...</equationsource></inlineequation>

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into...

This paper analyzes asymmetrically informed litigants' incentives to settle when they anticipate the possibility of appeals. It identifies a strategic effect, which induces a litigant to negotiate pretrial so as to optimize her posttrial bargaining position, and an information effect, which...

We study dynamic bargaining with uncertainty over the buyer's valuation and the seller's outside option. A long-lived seller makes offers to a long-lived buyer whose value is private information. There may exist a short-lived buyer whose value is higher than that of the long-lived buyer. The...

Experimental studies of two-person sequential bargaining demonstrate that the concept of subgame perfection is not a reliable predictor of actual behavior. Alternative explanations argue that fairness influences outcomes and that bargainer expectations matter and are likely not to be coordinated...

In this paper, we build and structurally estimate a complete information bargaining model of collective negotiation for Spain. For large firms, the assumption of complete information seems a sensible one, and it matches the collective bargaining environment better than the one provided by...