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Assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item, this paper defines a polynomial time multiitem auction that locates the VCG prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This auction is called the Vickrey-English-Dutch auction and it contains the Vickrey-English...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734765
Assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item, this paper defines a polynomial time multi-item auction that locates the VCG prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This auction is called the Vickrey–English–Dutch auction and it contains the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049710
Auctions used to allocate multiple units of a homogeneous good account for a large number of transactions in market economies, the most notable example perhaps being the allocation of financial and monetary instruments, such as bonds, bills and securities. The auction format used to sell many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145387
Ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price. Using this traditional definition, no ascending price auction can achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome for general private valuations in the combinatorial auction setting. We relax...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043169
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069418
To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory prices. However, several authors have recommended the ascending auction format. Basically, two “competing” ascending auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005684280
Available resources can often be limited with regard to the number of demands. In this paper we propose an approach for solving this problem which consists of using the mechanisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the resources to a set of software agents. We consider the resource problem as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627171
We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment office or head hunter. In a centralised...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739652
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147310
In a market of indivisible objects where a buyer consumes at most one object, the buyer-optimal auction is a multi-item generalization of Vickrey's second-price auction. If the optimal auction is formulated as a strategic game, it is well-known that it satisfies good incentive properties, i.e.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155674