We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision...

We survey the main results on strategic information transmission, which is often referred to as ``persuasion" when types are verifiable and as ``cheap talk" when they are not. In the simplest ``cheap talk'' model, an informed player sends a single message to a receiver who makes a decision. The...

We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision...

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model the sender can communicate...

Language is an imperfect and coarse means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental investigation of a setting in which the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at...